Proposal For Introducing a Programmatic, Market-Based Emission Mechanism Based on Staking Participation Rate

Answers to 1 & 2

REV based emissions method is interesting. We did consider that (see Alternative Design 2). It is complex to implement today. Even if implemented, there are real chances it can be gamed and/or proxy to benchmark REV is not fully correlated. Hence, we chose Staking Participation Rate to address the inflation issue — which is a today’s problem. It is easy to implement. Staking participation rate is one of the metrics to measure security. Extremely low stake is obviously dangerous. Excessively high stake is not providing incremental security. Hence, the choice of the shape of the curve. We also solved the problem with current curve on the downside. We added more emissions than the current curve in case the stake rate drops below 33%. Summary: Security is paramount. Inflation is high. We chose this approach after discarding 4 other approaches to balance network security and inflation.

Answer to 3

The issue with modeling elasticity is it is just a function of how good your inputs are. It would suffer from major garbage in, garbage out syndrome. That said, Umberto from Chorus One showed some positive correlation between staking participation rate and emissions. While that is supportive of the proposal claiming increased SOL in circulation for other use cases, I still maintain it is hard to model the behavior and is prone to modeler’s bias.

Answer to 4

We have incorporated community feedback, and have increased the rollout period to 50 epochs. Please note that starts from the deployment, which is optimistically about 6 months away. So, every one will have enough heads up of what’s coming.

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Emissions only go to zero if staking participation rate (S) reaches 100%. So never.

Thank you for your feedback. We have extended the rollout period to 50 epochs.

i hope our discord conversations in the mb-planning channel helped alleviate some of the concerns. especially how the full rollout is still a year away, and real yield drop to validators/stakers is not as high as it looks. also, we have extended the rollout to 50 epochs based on community feedback.

  1. We have extended the rollout to 50 epochs instead of 10 epochs to smoothen the impact.
  2. The drop should be considered from the day it is fully implemented and rolled out (which is likely a year out). Rationale below:
  3. Even if SIMD-0228 passes, it is not gonna get implemented for the next 6 months.
  4. It will have 50 epoch rollout
  5. The right comparison for inflation should be inflation pre SIMD 96
  6. Then decay it by 12 months.
  7. That emissions number is roughly 3%, assuming it is even okay to benchmark with an arbitrary curve.
  8. Stake % is bleeding. So, implied inflation from this curve would be ~1%, and implied staking rate would be ~1.7%

Above is the nominal yield impact. In fact, real yield impact would be even lower:

Today real yield: ~7% vs 4.7% = ~2.3%
Next year real yield post SIMD-0228: ~3% vs ~1.3%


Separately, there is work happening on reducing vote costs for validators in parallel.

Hope this context helps.

Thanks for adding this information @kankanivishal, I think it’s a non trivial consideration.

Indeed, as you can see from dashboards above, the current curve creates a bit of friction in unstaking (see here for a detailed discussion). This is because dilution from inflation would be very high, so the smart thing to do is to stake (that’s a primitive in PoS).

Now, if we assume ~1 y implementation and 50 epochs rollout, this means that SIMD228 will be effective around epoch 990. Issuance from current curve would be ~3.7%, and following the downside of the stake rate, this would lead to a fraction of 0.5 from total supply.

SIMD228 produce the same dilution (3.7%) at a stake rate of ~0.33, implying an APR of around 11.39%.

I think this is something we should consider when presenting the proposal to our delegators

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Is there a link showing the change?

@alphagamma both the proposal on github and the description here have been changed reporting 50 instead of 10

Can you share the link? Lost it from my bookmark and no longer able to find it

You can check the SIMD0228 in the Githug here. There you will also see a patch applied a few hours ago about this change.

Thanks for addressing the concerns. Based on this change and after also hearing our stakers, there is an overall understanding of the benefits of reducing inflation, so we will support with a positive vote to SIMD228.

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Has the vote been delayed?

For who is still looking for a data driven analysis, we delivered our full piece here.

We assess pros and cons of this proposal and you can make your own decision based on your take from the data.

For Chorus One this is a net positive. We think that the time needed to implement it and the time to rollout reduce the possible criticalities we previously spotted. We will be voting “yes” for proposal SIMD-228 by default, splitting the vote to eventually reflect delegators’ will.

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The stake weights for the voting on this proposal have been captured and published here:

SIMD-0228 solgov-distributor/votes/simd0228 at master · laine-sa/solgov-distributor · GitHub

You can verify the stake weights until end of the current epoch (752) against any public mainnet-beta RPC node. At the start of the next epoch voting token claiming will be available for validators to cast their votes.

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thank you for your work on this umberto & team

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starts in epoch 753!

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thank you OscarGF!!!

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Dear Solana Community,

P2P.org strongly believes in sustainable tokenomics as a foundation for long-term adoption and stability. We’re fully on board with the idea of minimizing inflation, and ensuring that value redistribution is kept efficient while still maintaining network security.

However, after reviewing SIMD-228, we have several concerns that prevent us from supporting it in its current form. Many of our stakers have shared similar reservations, and we want to make sure their voices are heard.

Security Considerations and Open Questions

While a dynamic emission model presents potential advantages over the current policy, further research is needed to fully understand the trade-offs between MNA and MVI. A deeper exploration is required to define an ideal validator set and assess how a new issuance model would support it under different market conditions.

Regarding the proposed threshold, we believe it warrants additional discussion, particularly from a security perspective.

  • The network remains secure as long as no single entity controls more than 2/3 of the total stake (66.666%), as this would allow them to manipulate transactions (e.g., double-spending).
  • A separate risk exists at 1/3 of total stake (33.333%), where an entity could halt consensus, disrupting network operations. While this scenario doesn’t provide direct financial gain, it could be strategically leveraged alongside market positions.

With the proposed optimal staked ratio of 33.333% (staked supply / total supply), the first type of attack would be highly impractical, as acquiring a 66.666% share would require purchasing a very large part of the unstaked supply and also gaining control over a portion of the already staked funds. However, the second type of attack—where an entity acquires and stakes more than 25% of unstaked SOL to obtain >33.333% of the total staked supply—remains a potential concern.

We encourage further discussion on these aspects to ensure the model is both robust and aligned with Solana’s long-term security and decentralization goals. The relationship between unstaked token acquisition and network vulnerability is illustrated in the accompanying figure.

Analysis of APR and Staked Ratio Considerations

The forum discussion explores a hypothetical scenario where the market seeks a 7.5% inflationary rewards APR. Under this assumption, with a terminal inflation rate of 1.5%, such a yield would only be achievable if the staked ratio drops to 20%, which is considered a potentially high-risk level. We’d like to explore this further:

  1. Long-Term Inflation Trajectory – The terminal inflation rate of 1.5% is projected to be reached in September 2032 (see dynamics chart). This means any impact on staking APR would unfold gradually over time under the current model, and the discussed risk is not present at the moment.
  2. 7.5% APR as a Market Target – It’s unclear why 7.5% APR was specifically chosen as the benchmark. Historically, Solana’s staking yields have dipped below this level multiple times without causing significant changes in the staked ratio.
  3. Defining an optimal Staked Ratio – Further clarification on how the proposal defines an optimal staked ratio would be helpful. Understanding the underlying assumptions behind this threshold could provide a more comprehensive view of potential risks.

We believe discussing these aspects further will help refine the proposal’s assumptions and ensure a well-rounded approach to staking dynamics.

Timeline Considerations

The proposed implementation schedule includes a 6-month hold period followed by 50 epochs (100 days) for gradual rollout, leading to full activation within approximately 9 months. Given the current state of the ecosystem, this timeline raises important concerns:

  • Readiness of Block Reward Mechanisms – Native mechanisms for block rewards sharing are unlikely to be in place within this timeframe. Without these mechanisms, delegators would experience a significant reduction in staking returns, with inflation dropping from 4.68% to 0.83%—a 5x decrease—in a relatively short period.
  • Impact on Stakers – The rapid reduction in rewards could disrupt incentives for staking participation, particularly given the absence of alternative mechanisms to mitigate the impact.
  • Urgency of Implementation – The risks associated with the current inflation model are projected to emerge over the long term, raising the question of whether such an accelerated rollout is necessary at this stage.

Given these factors, we believe a more measured approach may be beneficial. We encourage further discussion on the rationale behind the urgency of this timeline and whether adjustments could better balance security, incentives, and network stability.

Potential Impact on Validator Set Composition

The proposal lacks a framework for optimal validator set definition across staking scenarios and doesn’t adequately address how the new issuance curve affects validator sustainability and decentralization.

With reduced issuance, block and MEV rewards become critical factors in validator yields. This could lead to centralization as larger validators have better access to optimization opportunities.
A side note: this issue is likely to become even more pronounced if SIMD-123 isn’t implemented, as it would lead to increased competition in the development of reward-sharing mechanisms.


We are inclined to vote NO— but we remain open to discussions and refinements to ensure the best outcome for the network. We will continue to negotiate with our stakers and partners to find a balanced approach.—while we align with the long-term vision of reducing inflation, the current proposal lacks the necessary research and safeguards.

Staker-Driven Governance—We remain committed to engaging with our stakers. If a staker directly requests that their stake votes, we will split our voting weight accordingly.

We support the direction of SIMD-228 but recommend further refinement to ensure Solana’s economic security is preserved, especially in scenarios where staking participation declines.

We appreciate the effort behind this proposal and encourage continued discussions to strengthen Solana’s staking and issuance model in a data-driven and secure manner.

P2P.org Team

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Hey guys,

first of all, thanks to everyone for the great discussions, research, posts, X spaces etc. that were had in the past few days - great to see how the extended validator community came together. I don’t think any proposal on any chain enjoyed this kind of attention. Such a vivid governance engagement is unprecedented and potentially a huge leg up for the future. Awesome to see!

Now, beside a lot of external discussions and research, we synced internally on SIMD228 to have a cohesive standpoint from the POV of Staking Facilities.

Tl;dr: we have decided to vote in favor of SIMD-228 - below is our reasoning and some points of discussion we had, so that our vote comes with a bit of context.

Key reasons for our support

  • Maturing Network: High inflation was vital for bootstrapping security in Solana’s early days. Now that the network is more mature and benefits from significant fee-based revenue (block rewards & MEV), it is logical to reduce reliance on pure token emissions.
  • Macro Efficiency: Excessive inflation can create sizable sell pressure (tax & operating cost payments), while not always matching the network’s true security needs. Adjusting issuance more dynamically is a major step toward a healthier macroeconomic model.
  • Timing: With SIMD-96 boosting validator revenue + REV dominance of Solana overall, there is a window of opportunity for validators to recalibrate commissions. A more usage-driven mechanism (as envisioned by SIMD-228) aligns rewards with actual network activity, which should help keep Solana competitive.
  • Long-Term Commitment: Solana’s culture is rooted in taking decisive steps for the bigger picture. Adopting a more flexible, market-based mechanism now can foster sustained network growth and ensure we do not “overpay” for security.

Minor concerns / points of discussions

  • Validator Impact: While many analyses suggest smaller validators may manage this transition, it remains uncertain how stake distribution will evolve. We strongly advocate measures (like potential voting fee reductions) to help smaller validators remain viable - while omitting freeriders/grifters.
  • Liquidity & Staking Rates: We share the concern that large amounts of SOL could become liquid and be unevenly restaked across validators. This underscores the need for ongoing monitoring—and possibly additional safeguards—to preserve a diverse, decentralized validator set. Let’s see how LSTs play out and how much stake will end up liquified.
  • Future Bear Markets: The proposal assumes continued fee-driven revenue for validators, but transaction volume can fluctuate. A more advanced mechanism could dynamically account for fee volatility—offering a smoother cushion in down markets.
  • Gradual Adoption: We appreciate the extended 50-epoch establishment period. Nonetheless, a more phased approach (esp. in %terms) might have mitigated potential shocks and provided further time to iterate.
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thank you, Matthias!