The effect to tokenomics / supply inflation seems pretty neutral, so I am not concerned with that.
I think this goes part of the way in reducing off-chain agreements, but is not the whole picture. Imagine if a searcher has an OCA with a validator to rebate priority fees in exchange for a slice of the MEV. Then what happens? The searcher can systematically overpay on priority fees and outbid everyone else, thereby winning more, and sharing some of the profits with the validator. The MEV is presumably more lucrative than accepting the highest fee, so they will be incentivized to continue these type of arrangements. IMO, the only way to prevent something like that is to have a dynamic base fee that is burned, and unilateral to all participants such that they can’t ignore it, and it becomes a cost center to the searcher. Currently, trivial base fee can be pretty much ignored.
Anyway, I don’t object to how or what the proposal is presenting, just that I think it won’t solve the issue of off-chain agreements. Happy to hear any explanations for why my reasoning wrong, also.